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Abstract: This research aims to show the effectiveness of Operator Event Sequence Diagrams (OESDs)
in the normative modelling of vehicle automation to human drivers’ handovers and validate the
models with observations from a study in a driving simulator. The handover of control from
automation to human operators has proved problematic, and in the most extreme circumstances
catastrophic. This is currently a topic of much concern in the design of automated vehicles. OESDs
were used to inform the design of the interaction, which was then tested in a driving simulator.
This test provided, for the first time, the opportunity to validate OESDs with data gathered from
videoing the handover processes. The findings show that the normative predictions of driver activity
determined during the handover from vehicle automation in a driving simulator performed well,
and similar to other Human Factors methods. It is concluded that OESDs provided a useful method
for the human-centred automation design and, as the predictive validity shows, can continue to
be used with some confidence. The research in this paper has shown that OESDs can be used to
anticipate normative behaviour of drivers engaged in handover activities with vehicle automation in
a driving simulator. Therefore, OESDs offer a useful modelling tool for the Human Factors profession
and could be applied to a wide range of applications and domains.
Keywords: automation; driving; handovers; modelling; OESD
1. Introduction
Modelling in Ergonomics and Human Factors has a long tradition [1–3]. This tradition
of modelling goes back to the dawn of the discipline, with the invention ‘Therblig’, a term
used to describe a basic human action [4]. Therbligs comprised 18 elements, including:
search, find, select, grasp, hold, transport, position, assemble, use, disassemble, inspect,
release, delay, plan and rest. These elements were used by Gilbreth and colleagues to model
a human manual performance in pursuit of more effective and efficient work patterns.
Operator Event Sequence Diagrams [5,6] may be considered as a development of the ap-
proach to model human–machine interactions in a pictorial representation. Operator Event
Sequence Diagrams can be used as part of the interaction design process in developing
new interfaces between humans and technology [7]. This may be thought of in terms
of the co-evolution of sociotechnical systems, where the human activity and technical
process are designed together [8], rather than the human activity resulting from tasks left
over from automation [9]. There are many examples of the application of Operator Event
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Sequence Diagrams, such as: modelling single pilot operations in commercial aviation [10],
aircraft landing [11], air traffic control [12], electrical energy distribution [13], maritime
collision avoidance [5], process control [6] and automatic emergency braking systems in
automobiles [14]. Despite this wide variety of applications, there is scant validation evi-
dence to support their continued use [15–17]. This paper has the twin aims of showing the
application of Operator Event Sequence Diagrams to the design of the automated vehicle
to driver handover task and providing validation evidence from a high-fidelity driving
simulator study.
In one of the very first applications of Operator Event Sequence Diagrams, Kurke [5]
showed how this method could be used to design navigation systems on a maritime vessel.
The representation was used to compare collision avoidance using the traditional approach
with a new computer supported approach. Kurke argued that, in the new approach, a
computer would automatically calculate the closest point of approach; thus, minimizing
error and reducing collision risk. Comparing the two Operator Event Sequence Diagrams
side by side allows the analyst to see how the work of the Watch Officer had changed with
the introduction of the computer support. This can help to ensure that the system design has
been constructed to establish meaningful operational procedures [5], something Gilbreth [4]
himself was also keen to promote. More recently, Harris et al. [10] also used Operator Event
Sequence Diagrams to compare the work of two pilots on the flight deck of a civil aircraft
with that of a single-pilot configuration. Again, the authors invited the reader to spot the
difference in a side-by-side comparison of the two versions of the work. The revised work
allocation in the reduced crewing option showed that the workload did not reduce by half
(although there were substantially fewer cross-checks and communications) and could
potentially overload the single pilot [10]. Both of these examples, and others, show the
value of Operator Event Sequence Diagrams in modelling future versions of systems and
them being able to anticipate the work that might be undertaken. Banks et al. [14] showed
how Operator Event Sequence Diagrams can be applied to the design of the interaction
between the human driver and the various vehicle subsystems for driving automation. The
current paper focuses on the interaction between driver and in-vehicle subsystems during
handover of control.
Other modelling approaches in Ergonomics and Human Factors have determined
predictions about human error [18–21], time to perform tasks [22–24]), visual sampling
behaviour [2,25] and the structure of work [26,27]. The advantage of Operator Event Se-
quence Diagrams is that they make the interactions between various subsystems (including
the human operators) explicit, within and between ‘swim-lanes’ (the columns containing
work associated with each of the actors). Each swim-lane contains the activities of that
subsystem, and interactions are depicted as connectors across the swim-lane. Similar to
Therbligs [4], the approach has a taxonomy of activities, but these can apply to both the
social and technical subsystems. Operator Event Sequence Diagrams categories include:
process, decision, delay, display, inspection, operation, receipt, speech, storage and trans-
port [5–7]. Several of these seem very similar to the Therbligs (such as: delay, inspection
and transport), but rather than applying solely to human activities, they can also be applied
to the technical aspects of the system. Connectors are used in Operator Event Sequence
Diagrams to make explicit links between the inputs and outputs of one or more subsystems.
Human Factors methods are designed to improve product design by understanding
or predicting user interaction with devices [15]. These approaches have a long tradition in
system design and tend to have a greater impact (as well as a reduced cost) when applied
early on in the design process [15,16]. Kirwan and Ainsworth [6] noted that the original
purpose of Operator Event Sequence Diagrams was to represent complex, multi-person
tasks. The output of an Operator Event Sequence Diagram graphically depicts a task
process, including the tasks performed and the interaction between operators over time,
using standardised symbols. The OESD symbol set leads one to evaluate specific aspects of
human interface elements while generic SysML activities within SysML activity diagrams
do not force this specification (see [28], for an example of SysML applied to design). There
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are numerous forms of Operator Event Sequence Diagrams, ranging from a simple flow
diagram representing the task order, to more complex analyses of team interaction and
communication, and often including a timeline of the scenario under analysis and potential
sources of error. Operator Event Sequence Diagrams have been used during the design of
complex systems, such as nuclear power and petrochemical processing plants [6].
Kurke [5] originally proposed Operator Event Sequence Diagrams for the human–
machine systems interaction design as well as the layout of the interfaces. His examples
focused on the design of interfaces between humans and machines to specify the sequence
of operations between these subsystems (Kurke’s analysis had swim-lanes for the object
to be avoided, the ship, the computer and the Watch Officer). As such, Operator Event
Sequence Diagrams may be best suited to a scenario analysis where there are discrete sets
of tasks to be undertaken. In the present study, we analysed the handover of vehicle control
between human drivers and automation, which is presented in the next section.
2. Development of the Operator Event Sequence Diagram for Automation–Human
Driver Handover
This section focuses on the first aim of the paper by showing the application of
Operator Event Sequence Diagrams to the design of the automated vehicle to driver
handover task. The rationale for the interaction design is described as well as further detail
regarding the elements captured in the diagrams.
Descriptions on the development of Operator Event Sequence Diagrams may be found
in books on Human Factors methods [6,7]. In essence, the scenario start and end points are
decided, together with the main actors. The analysis presented in the current paper was
based on a use-case of a vehicle automation handover scenario on a UK motorway with an
SAE level four vehicle [29]. The use case stated that drivers would be expected to drive
manually onto the motorway and hand the driving task over to vehicle automation when
it becomes available. Whilst vehicle automation is engaged, the driver would be free to
engage in non-driving tasks (such as reading, emailing, working on a tablet computer). The
vehicle would alert the driver of the need to take back control of the vehicle in a planned,
non-emergency, handover in a timely manner before the exit junction. Failure to take back
manual control of the vehicle would result in the vehicle continuing on the motorway until
it either ran out of fuel or road. In which case, the vehicle would automatically pull over
and come to a halt on the hard shoulder (for regular motorways) or Emergency Refuge Area
(in the case of smart motorways). The handovers are described using the task elements
from Operator Event Sequence Diagrams as shown in Table 1.
Table 1. Key for the Operator Event Sequence Diagrams.
OESD Task Elements Description
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Figure 1. Human driver in control when automation becomes available.
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The 10 swim-lanes show the different ‘actors’ under consideration in the design of the
handovers to and from the human driver and vehicle automation (via the instrument cluster
(instruments viewed through the steering wheel), HUD (Head-Up Display viewed in the
windscreen or windshield), centre console (the upper part of the centre of the dashboard),
ambient (lighting around the dashboard and vehicle interior) and haptic (vibration through
the driver’s seat) displays). The arrows are connectors that show the links between the
events in the swim-lanes. The handover protocol presented in Figures 1–5 was designed
to raise the situation awareness of drivers, by presenting them with contextually relevant
questions about the vehicle status, other road users as well as the surrounding environment
and infrastructure. This was based on the research evidence that the degraded performance
of drivers of automated vehicles is, in part, due to poor situation awareness [30]. For
example, the collisions in the Tesla and Uber vehicles report that the driver was not aware
of the environment outside the vehicle [31,32]. As can be seen in Figure 1, it was assumed
that the vehicle is under manual control (orange ambient cabin lighting mode in Figure 1)
until the system detects that the road is suitable for automation to operate (blue ambient
cabin lighting mode in Figure 2). Then, the system prompts the driver with the message
that automation is available, via the four interfaces (cluster, HUD, centre console and






Figure 2. From automation activated (and driver working on a secondary, non-driving task) up to advice that automation
handover needs to begin.






Figure 3. Driver resumes driving position and engages in handover protocol.










Figure 5. Human driver resumes manual control.
If the driver chooses to engage vehicle automation, then they would press two buttons
on the steering wheel with their thumbs simultaneously (assuming that their hands are in
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the ten-to-two clock position on the steering wheel). At this point, the interfaces would
display “Automation Activated” followed by “The car is in control” (see Figure 2). At the
same time, the ambient lighting in the car would change from orange (indicating manual
driving mode) to blue (indicating automated driving mode). Then, the driver is able to
engage in non-driving tasks (on a tablet computer in this scenario, as level four SAE is
assumed, so there is no need for the driver to monitor the automated driving system). The
scenario assumes that there is a planned handover of driving from automation back to the
human driver (such as when their exit from the motorway is coming up, which would
have been pre-programmed into the satellite navigation system). The driver is given a five,
then two, then one minutes notice that the handover process will begin (see Figure 2).
Upon the prompt from the automated system that the driver needs to become ready
to drive, it is assumed that the driver ceases the non-driving task, puts down the tablet
computer and resumes the driving position (as shown in Figure 3). The system then
presents a series of questions designed to raise the situation awareness of the driver (such
as: What speed is the vehicle currently travelling at? What lane are you currently in? What
colour is the vehicle in front of you? What is your remaining fuel range? Can you see
a bend in the road ahead?. The driver is expected to respond to these questions (which
are presented auditorily as well as on all of the visual interfaces). If the answer is correct,
then the next question is presented until all questions have been answered. If the answer
is incorrect, then the question is repeated for a maximum of two additional times before
moving onto the next question. When all questions have been presented, the handover
interaction moves on to that presented in Figure 3.
The driver is then requested to take manual control of the vehicle, which will mean
placing both hands on the steering wheel and positioning their foot on the accelerator
pedal. To transfer control from the automated system to the driver, they need to press two
buttons mounted on the steering wheel at the ten-to-two clock position with their thumbs
(in the same manner as they do for handing control over to the vehicle automation system).
As Figure 5 shows, when control of the vehicle is passed back to the human driver,
the ambient lighting changes back from blue to orange (indicating the vehicle is now in
manual driving mode) and the words “Automation deactivated” are presented auditorily
as well as on the visual displays. This is followed by the words “You are in control”, which
are also presented auditorily and on the visual displays. The human driver is now driving
the vehicle.
As well as showing how Operator Event Sequence Diagrams can be used to design
the interactions between automations and humans, the other aim of this study was to
empirically validate the approach. This is introduced in the following section.
3. Validation of Methods
The remainder of the paper focuses on aim two, the validation of OESDs modelling
using evidence of actual behaviour from a high-fidelity driving simulator study. The
validation of Ergonomics and Human Factors methods has proved very challenging to
the community, with scant evidence produced on even the most commonly used ap-
proaches [15–17]. To paraphrase Stanton and Young [15], ‘validity is often assumed but
seldom empirically tested’. Most Ergonomics and Human Factors methods have a theoretical
construct and content validity, which helps to convey the credibility of the method to its
users. This means that it is often based on a contemporary theory and uses appropriate
terminology. With systems theory in ascendancy [30], there is perhaps a resurgence of
interest in Operator Event Sequence Diagrams, as they are able to represent the interactions
between subsystems.
Nevertheless, establishing a concurrent and predictive validity for contemporary
applications, such as road vehicle automation, is a priority. Just because a method has
60 years of use, it does not necessarily mean that validation is proven, nor that the validity
generalisation can be assumed. Therefore, a concurrent and predictive validity needs to be
formally tested [16,17,33,34]. Such validations were undertaken for methods that predict
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error [35–37] and task time [23,24,38]. A comparison of the reliability and validity of a
range of Human Factors methods was undertaken by Stanton and Young [15,16,39]. These
studies show that the methods vary quite considerably in their performance. Previous work
made use of the signal detection paradigm for validity testing of Ergonomics and Human
Factors methods [15,16,34]. This approach was used in the current paper and, based on
previous work, it was expected that Operator Event Sequence Diagrams would achieve
reasonable levels of validity, above the threshold for acceptance for use in modelling the
automation–human interaction.
4. Methods
The methods section covers the recruitment of participants, the design of the study,
equipment used, and procedure followed together with the approach for data reduction
and analysis.
5. Participants
In this study 65 participants were recruited in three age bands. Twenty-five were
aged between 18 and 34 (mean = 26.6, SD = 4.4), twenty were aged between 35 and 56
(mean = 43.8, SD = 5.8) and twenty were aged between 57 and 82 (mean = 64.8, SD = 5.0).
All of the participants were drawn from the general population, had full UK driving licenses
and were in good health with corrected vision (where applicable). Ethical permission for
the study was granted by the University of Southampton Research and Governance Office
(ERGO number 41761.A3). Each participant was briefed on the nature of the study and
made aware of their right to withdraw at any time. All participants signed a consent form
prior to taking part in the study.
6. Study Design
The Operator Event Sequence Diagram was used to develop the design of the han-
dover interface (see Figure 2). This meant that the expected behaviour of the human driver
and automated system together with their interaction could be predicted. To determine the
accuracy of this prediction, it was compared with video footage of the actual behaviour of
the 65 human drivers who took part in this study.
This study comprised three driver-to-automation and three automation-to-driver
handovers repeated over four trials (12 of each handover type in total, although this
analysis was focused solely on the automation-to-human handovers). Two of the trials had
a shorter out-of-the loop activity (i.e., 1 min) and two of the trials had a longer out-of-the-
loop activity (i.e., 10 min). These longer (but still relatively short) and short out-of-the-loop
activity trials were counterbalanced. The last automation-to-human driver handover for
each trial was analysed in this study due to the volume of data, and assuming optimal
familiarity during the latter stages of each trial (65 drivers and 4 handovers analysed
per driver).
7. Equipment
The driving simulator was based on a Land Rover Discovery Sport vehicle interior,
with a fixed base running STISIM software (see Figure 6). The simulated driving environ-
ment comprised a congested, three-lane, motorway (to simulate the rush hour in the UK)
in dry conditions with good visibility. To help reduce mode error [40,41], the cabin ambient
lighting displayed two distinct colours. As shown in Figure 6, blue was used to indicate
that the vehicle was under automated control and orange was used to indicate the vehicle
was under manual driver control.
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presented on the tablet to start the handover process. This was accompanied by a speech
alert through the vehicle speakers.
A control desk at the rear of the vehicle was used by the experimenter as a ‘Wizard-of-
Oz’ environment, to interpret the driver’s vocal responses to the speech synthesis questions
during the handover process. If the driver gave an incorrect response, then the question
was repeated until a correct response was given. If more than two incorrect responses were
given, then the next question was presented until all questions were answered. Then, the
driver was requested to resume manual driving. All handovers were planned (not as a
result of an emergency or system failure) and proceeded at the pace of the driver.
8. Procedure
On arrival at the driving simulation facility, participants were welcomed, and pre-
sented with a participant information sheet informing them of the details of the study. Their
right to halt the study at any time was explained, they were then provided with an informed
consent form which they had to read, initial and sign in order for the study to continue. On
completion of the consent form, participants were given a bibliographical form to complete
to capture demographics data. They were then introduced to the simulator. The main
driving controls were explained, and they were informed of the functionality of the vehicle
automation and the human–machine interfaces (instrument cluster, head-up display, centre
console, haptic seat, speech input/output and ambient light display). Participants then
took part in a test run, where they experienced three handovers after 1 min out-of-the-loop
intervals. After completion of the test run, the main trials started with the participant
being asked to accelerate onto the motorway, join the middle lane, keep up with traffic
and follow the instructions presented on the displays. After a period of approximately
one minute, the displays indicated to the participant that automation was available and
informed them via text, icon, vocalisation and two flashing green steering wheel buttons.
Participants then activated automation by pressing the two steering wheel buttons; this was
followed by the instruction indicating that the automation system was now in control of the
vehicle. Participants then picked up the secondary task tablet and started to engage with
the Tetromino secondary task. After a period of either 1 min or 10 min, dependent upon
counterbalancing, the automation indicated via the displays that the driver was required to
become ready to take control. Participants were expected to put aside their secondary task,
and follow the instructions presented on the displays. The handover protocol consisted of
a set of questions designed to raise situation awareness. These questions were presented in
vocal, word and icon form. Participants responded vocally to each question, the answers
to which were judged by an experimenter taking the part of the automation system using
the Wizard-of-Oz approach. Incorrect or missed questions were repeated twice before
moving to the next. When all the questions were answered by the participant, the HMI
indicated for them to take control, which they performed by pressing the two green buttons
on the steering wheel. This constituted one handover, the process was repeated twice more;
after completion, the participant was asked to pull safely to the hard shoulder and stop
the vehicle. This process was repeated three more times, allowing participants to adjust
the handover displays after each trial. Once the trials were complete, participants were
debriefed and thanked for their time.
9. Data Reduction and Analysis
The video data for each driver during the handover process were reduced into hits,
misses, false alarms and correct rejections by comparison with the Operator Event Sequence
Diagram as follows (and in Table 2):
Hits: present in the video and the Operator Event Sequence Diagram;
Misses: present in the video but not the Operator Event Sequence Diagram;
False Alarms: not present in video but present in Operator Event Sequence Diagram;
Correct rejections: not present in video and not present in Operator Event Se-
quence Diagram.
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Table 2. Signal detection paradigm for Operator Event Sequence Diagram (OESD).
Behaviour Present in Video
Yes No
Behaviour present in OESD
Yes HIT FALSE ALARM
No MISS CORRECT REJECTION
The latter category can be difficult to calculate as it could be infinity, but for the
purposes of this investigation, it was based on the total number of false alarms generated
by all 65 participants, minus the number of false alarms for each individual participant.
Inter-rater reliability testing was conducted on the categorisation scheme for approxi-
mately ten percent of the video footage between two analysts. Equal weighted Cohen’s
Kappa was calculated (0.718) showing an acceptable agreement between the two indepen-
dent analyses in their classification of hits, misses, false alarms and correct rejections [42].
The data for each trial were pooled and Matthews Correlation Coefficient (Phi: [43])
was used to quantify the correlation between the expected and observed behaviour, as a
means to validate the OESDs, which was calculated using the following formula:
ϕ = Hit× CR− FA × Miss √ (Hit + FA) (Hit + Miss) (CR + FA) (CR + Miss)
Phi was selected as an appropriate statistic for the validation of Human Factors
methods, as it has been previously used with some success [15,39]. In particular, the
method of categorising the data offered a way of correlating predicted behaviours from the
OESD with those observed in the videos of the drivers in the simulator.
10. Results
The frequency of hits, misses, false alarms and correct rejections for each of the four
handovers (one for each trial) are presented in Figure 8. The box-and-whisker plots show
the median (thick line) range (whisker to whisker) and interquartile range (the box) as well
as the mean (red circle) and outliers (black circles). As Figure 8 shows, the hits were quite
high (10 on average) and misses were low (2 on average). Similarly, the false alarms were
low (0 on average) and correct rejections were high (45 on average). This was encouraging
for the usefulness of Operator Event Sequence Diagrams to predict driver–automation
handover activity before empirical studies.
The hit rate (hits/hits + misses) was similarly encouraging, with a median of one and
a mean very close to one, as shown in Figure 9. A hit rate of one is perfect. This means that
the Operator Event Sequence Diagram process was able to identify most of the behaviours
that were observed.
The false alarm rate (false alarms/false alarms + correct rejections) was very low, with
a median of 0 and a mean around 0.03, as shown in Figure 10. This means that the Operator
Event Sequence Diagrams process tended not to predict behaviours that did not occur.
Finally, Phi was above 0.8 (the criterion value) for both median and mean values, as
shown in Figure 11. This means that the Operator Event Sequence Diagrams had a good
predictive validity, at least for the driver–automation handover activity. It should be noted
that the outlier in trial three at zero did not go through any of the handover protocol and
simply took manual control of the vehicle. The design of the vehicle allowed drivers to
take manual control at any point, but it was anticipated that they would go through the
handover protocol before resuming manual control.
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11. Discussion
The main finding from this study was that the Operator Event Sequence Diagram
presented in this paper was able to produce reasonable predictions of the handover activity
conducted by human drivers in all four trials to an acceptable level (as shown in Figure 11).
This is very encouraging for the method as not all Ergonomics and Human Factors methods
performed this well [15,16,34,39]. For example, similar values have been reported for the
Systematic Human Error Reduction Prediction Approach [44] and the Keystroke Level
Model [15]. Although Operator Event Sequence Diagrams have been in continuous use
over the past 60 years, we know of no other formal test of predictive validity [17]. This
finding has important implications for the use of the method as a modelling activity before
empirical studies with human participants. This lends credibility to the comparative
analysis used by others for choosing between alternative design solutions [5,6,10] and
modelling future human–automation interactions [45]. Indeed, on the basis of this study,
Operator Event Sequence Diagrams could be seen as a possible method for discriminating
between alternative approaches for the human–automation interaction, where there are
too many alternatives for empirical studies.
Moray [3] proposed that the modelling of human performance in technological sys-
tems has long been the goal of the discipline of Ergonomics and Human Factors. Certainly,
this would help raise the credibility of the methods as in the engineering of systems. Some
progress has already been made on the empirical validation of some of the methods, such
as those that predict task-related human error [37] and task time [23,24], which have shown
acceptable levels of performance. The prediction of the tasks themselves is what was pre-
sented in the current research. Certainly, the performance of the Operator Event Sequence
Diagram in the study of handover has achieved similar levels to those reported for other
methods [7,34]. This means that there is good evidence for their continued use, but future
studies should attempt to provide validation data in a range of applications and domains.
Research into handovers in a wide range of domains has shown that this task is
problematic [46], particularly with the failure to transmit appropriate information from one
agent to another [20]. Certainly, handovers from automated systems to human drivers are
no exception [31,47]. This is a field of endeavour that is currently challenging researchers to
facilitate raising the situation awareness of the driver before the handover is completed [30].
Situation awareness is a hotly debated topic in Human Factors, with views ranging from
it being a concept that resides in the mind of humans [48] to that of it being embedded
within the interaction of a sociotechnical system [49]. In vehicle automation, there is an
argument for the latter approach [30]. Certainly, an automated vehicle needs to be aware of
the surrounding vehicles, road environment and infrastructure similar to a human driver,
albeit in different ways. In the handover process, some vehicle manufacturers are simply
providing a countdown for the time until vehicle control becomes the responsibility of the
human driver. This approach does not provide any guarantee about what is transferred in
the handover. The approach presented in this paper took inspiration from human–human
handovers [50], which aim to support the transaction of awareness of the situation between
system agents. The Operator Event Sequence Diagrams can help to make the specification
of what is to be transacted more explicit in the design of the interfaces, as was the case in
the study reported in this paper.
What the Operator Event Sequence Diagram was not able to predict was the occasion
when the driver simply took control of the vehicle without going through the formal
handover protocol. This was just one participant, as shown in Figure 11 on trial 3. That
stated, one would not wish to design a handover protocol that would force drivers to go
through every handover step if they wanted to resume control immediately. The design of
the handover protocol was focused on guiding drivers back into the driving task through a
series of situation awareness transactions between the driver and vehicle [30].
At present, Operator Event Sequence Diagrams model normative performance of
systems. Armed with this early validation evidence, their use could be expanded to include
the non-normative performance of systems [32]. Typically, such an analysis tended to
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focus on either human [18] or technical [51] failures in systems, although not exclusively
so [20,52]. A possible future direction for the further development of Operator Event
Sequence Diagrams could address the potential to model failures in automation and
suboptimal responses by human drivers together. The ‘miss’ data observed in the current
study could serve as a starting point for the modelling of alternative human activity, such
as taking over control of the vehicle at any point during the handover protocol.
Another avenue for the development of Operator Event Sequence Diagrams could be
the addition of time data to both the human and technical activities, to model the minimum,
maximum and median handover times [38]. Prediction of task time is quite popular in
Human Factors modelling [22], and there are examples of application in domains such
as the human–computer interaction [23], rail [24] and in-car infotainment systems [38].
Given the growing literature on automation–human handover times, (see Eriksson and
Stanton, [53] for a review), modelling such activities could prove useful in helping to
understanding how to improve the design and efficiency of the protocols.
There is the broader question of the validation of Human Factors and Ergonomics
methods more generally to be addressed by the community [17]. These are obvious
differences between novice [15,16,39] and expert analysts [54,55], with experts showing
better validity data than novices. However, there are also domain differences in validity
data, suggesting that the classification schemes may have a domain bias (Stanton et al.,
2009). The classification scheme for the activities in Operator Event Sequence Diagrams
has developed over the past 60 years [5], with developments in technologies and the
changing nature of human work. It is reasonable to expect the scheme to continue to
evolve, particularly as technologies become more animated and with developments in
automation and artificial intelligence [30].
In broad terms, this paper also demonstrated how Operator Event Sequence Diagrams
can be used to undertake the human-centred automation design, focusing on the handover
problem. It is suggested that the approach can be used in the co-evolution of both human
and technical subsystems with the sociotechnical systems paradigm [56]. Operator Event
Sequence Diagrams are used to guide the task sequences and define what needs to appear
on the interfaces in different media. Each of the media had their own ‘swim-lane’, so that the
design could be coordinated. In this way, the Operator Event Sequence Diagrams provided
a structured approach to guide the design. In each stage of the design, the interaction
was simulated in the Operator Event Sequence Diagram first, to check that the automated
and human agents were coordinated. When satisfied that this was the case, the prototype
interfaces were built and tested with human participants in a driving simulator. Some
iteration between the Operator Event Sequence Diagrams and the simulator prototypes
was required before the final interfaces were accepted for testing with drivers.
12. Conclusions
This paper sought to apply Operator Event Sequence Diagrams to the design of the
semi-automated vehicle to the driver handover task and provide validation evidence
by comparing theoretical design modelling to behaviours observed from a high-fidelity
driving simulator study. The findings from the study demonstrated that the Operator
Event Sequence Diagram was a useful method, when rigorously applied, for assisting
in the specification of the interaction design strategies for normative handover protocols
(i.e., error free) between road vehicle automation and human drivers. This led to the
development of the design of the interfaces and questions to raise the awareness of the
driver about their own vehicle status, the presence of other vehicles and road environment.
The empirical study in a driving simulator showed that the driver behaviours, as predicted
in the Operator Event Sequence Diagram, largely matched those observed in videos of the
handover protocol from automation to human drivers. Further research could consider
extending the scope of Operator Event Sequence Diagrams to predicting error and task
time. Conducting studies to provide evidence of a validity generalization in other domains
and applications remains an important goal for the future. Indeed, the approach was
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general enough to be applied to the handover of control in other types of vehicles, such as
trains, aircraft and ships.
13. Key Points
• Vehicle automation–human driver handover can be modelling using Operator Event
Sequence Diagrams;
• These normative models can be used to predict the behaviour of drivers during
the handover;
• The Operator Event Sequence Diagrams were validated by comparing with behaviour
of drivers in a simulator;
• The signal detection paradigm can be used to validate predictions against ob-
served behaviours.
Author Contributions: Conceptualization, N.A.S. and S.T.; methodology, N.A.S.; software, L.S. and
S.T.; validation, N.A.S., J.W.B., K.M.A.R., J.C., J.R., P.L., M.B., N.C., L.S. and S.T..; formal analysis,
S.T.; investigation, J.W.B., J.C., J.R., P.L., M.B., N.C., and S.T.; resources, L.S and S.T..; data curation,
J.W.B..; writing—original draft preparation, N.A.S. and J.W.B.; writing—review and editing, N.A.S.,
J.W.B., K.M.A.R., J.C., J.R., P.L., M.B., N.C., L.S. and S.T.; visualization, J.W.B. and N.C.; supervision,
N.A.S.; project administration, J.R.; funding acquisition, N.A.S., P.L. and L.S. All authors have read
and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.
Funding: This research was supported by Jaguar Land Rover and the UK-EPSRC under grant number
EP/N011899/1 as part of the jointly funded Towards Autonomy: Smart and Connected Control
(TASCC) Programme.
Institutional Review Board Statement: The study was conducted according to the guidelines of the
Declaration of Helsinki, and approved by the Ethics, Research and Governance Office (ERGO) at the
University of Southampton (protocol number 41761.A3 approved on 14 October 2018).
Informed Consent Statement: Informed consent was obtained from all subjects involved in the study.
Data Availability Statement: These data are not publically available as permission for reuse was not
sought from the ethics research and governance committee nor was it agreed to by the participants in
the study.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.
References
1. Carbonell, J.R.; Ward, J.L.; Senders, J.W. A queueing model of visual sampling experimental validation. IEEE Transactions on
Man-Machine Systems. IEEE Trans. Man-Mach. Syst. 1968, 9, 82–87. [CrossRef]
2. Moray, N. Real Prediction of Real Performance. In People and Rail Systems; Wilson, J.R., Norris, B., Clarke, T., Mills, A., Eds.; CRC
Press: Boca Raton, FL, USA, 2007; p. 14.
3. Moray, N.; Groeger, J.; Stanton, N.A. Quantitative modelling in Cognitive Ergonomics: Predicting Signals Passed At Danger.
Ergonomics 2017, 60, 206–220. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
4. Gilbreth, F.B. Bricklaying System; MC Clark Publishing Company: New York, NY, USA, 1909.
5. Kurke, M.I. Operational Sequence Diagrams in systems design. Hum. Factors 1961, 3, 66–73. [CrossRef]
6. Kirwan, B.; Ainsworth, L.K. (Eds.) A Guide to Task Analysis: The Task Analysis Working Group; CRC Press: Boca Raton, FL,
USA, 1992.
7. Stanton, N.A.; Salmon, P.M.; Rafferty, L.A.; Walker, G.H.; Baber, C.; Jenkins, D. Human Factors Methods: A Practical Guide for
Engineering and Design, 2nd ed.; CRC Press: Boca Raton, FL, USA, 2013.
8. Walker, G.H.; Stanton, N.A.; Salmon, P.M.; Jenkins, D.P. A review of sociotechnical systems theory: A classic concept for new
command and control paradigms. Theor. Issues Ergon. Sci. 2009, 9, 479–499. [CrossRef]
9. Bainbridge, L. Ironies of Automation. Automatica 1983, 19, 775–779. [CrossRef]
10. Harris, D.; Stanton, N.A.; Starr, A. Spot the difference: Operational event sequence diagrams as a formal method for work
allocation in the development of single-pilot operations for commercial aircraft. Ergonomics 2015, 58, 1773–1791. [CrossRef]
[PubMed]
11. Sorensen, L.J.; Stanton, N.A.; Banks, A.P. Back to SA school: Contrasting three approaches to situation awareness in the cockpit.
Theor. Issues Ergon. Sci. 2011, 12, 451–471. [CrossRef]
12. Walker, G.H.; Stanton, N.A.; Baber, C.; Wells, L.; Gibson, H.; Salmon, P.M.; Jenkins, D.P. From ethnography to the EAST method:
A tractable approach for representing distributed cognition in air traffic control. Ergonomics 2010, 53, 184–197. [CrossRef]
Future Transp. 2021, 1 368
13. Salmon, P.M.; Stanton, N.A.; Walker, G.H.; Jenkins, D.P.; Baber, C.; McMaster, R. Representing Situation Awareness in Collabora-
tive Systems: A case study in the energy distribution domain. Ergonomics 2008, 51, 367–384. [CrossRef]
14. Banks, V.A.; Stanton, N.A.; Harvey, C. Sub-systems on the road to vehicle automation: Hands and feet free but not ‘mind’ free
driving. Saf. Sci. 2014, 62, 505–514. [CrossRef]
15. Stanton, N.A.; Young, M.S. What price ergonomics? Nature 1999, 399, 197–198. [CrossRef]
16. Stanton, N.A.; Young, M.S. A Guide to Methodology in Ergonomics: Designing for Human Use, 1st ed.; Taylor & Francis: London,
UK, 1999.
17. Stanton, N.A. On the Reliability and Validity of, and Training in, Ergonomics Methods: A Challenge Revisited. Theor. Issues Ergon.
Sci. 2016, 17, 345–353. [CrossRef]
18. Embrey, D.E. SHERPA: A systematic human error reduction and prediction approach. In Proceedings of the International Topical
Meeting on Advances in Human Factors in Nuclear Power Systems, Knoxville, TN, USA, 21–24 April 1986.
19. Lane, R.; Stanton, N.A.; Harrison, D. Applying hierarchical task analysis to medication administration errors. Appl. Ergon. 2006,
37, 669–679. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
20. Stanton, N.A.; Harvey, C. Beyond human error taxonomies in assessment of risk in sociotechnical systems: A new paradigm with
the EAST ‘broken-links’ approach. Ergonomics 2017, 60, 221–233. [CrossRef]
21. Parnell, K.J.; Banks, V.A.; Plant, K.L.; Griffin, T.G.C.; Beecroft, P.; Stanton, N.A. Predicting design induced error on the flight deck:
An aircraft engine oil leak scenario. Hum. Factors 2019, 0018720819872900. [CrossRef]
22. Card, S.K.; Moran, T.P.; Newell, A. The Psychology of Human-Computer Interaction; Lawrence Erlbaum: Hillsdale, NJ, USA, 1983.
23. Baber, C.; Mellor, B. Using critical path analysis to model multimodal human–computer interaction. Int. J. Hum.-Comput. Stud.
2001, 54, 613–636. [CrossRef]
24. Stanton, N.A.; Baber, C. Modelling of alarm handling responses times: A case of the Ladbroke Grove rail accident in the UK.
Ergonomics 2008, 51, 423–440. [CrossRef]
25. Clark, J.; Stanton, N.A.; Revell, K.M.A. Distractibility, Eye-gaze, and the Usage of Visual Displays during an Automated Vehicle
Handover Task. Transp. Res. Part F Psychol. Behav. 2019, 67, 29–42. [CrossRef]
26. Stanton, N.A. Hierarchical task analysis: Developments, applications and extensions. Appl. Ergon. 2006, 37, 55–79. [CrossRef]
27. Stanton, N.A. Representing Distributed Cognition in Complex Systems: How a submarine returns to periscope depth. Ergonomics
2014, 57, 403–418. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
28. Watson, M.E.; Rusnock, C.F.; Colombi, J.M.; Miller, M.E. Human-Centered Design Using System Modeling Language. J. Cogn.
Eng. Decis. Mak. 2017, 11, 252–269. [CrossRef]
29. SAE On-road Automated Vehicles Standards Committee. Taxonomy and Definitions for Terms Related to On-Road Motor Vehicle
Automated Driving Systems. SAE Stand. J 2014, 3016, 1–16. Available online: http://standards.sae.org/j3016_201401/ (accessed
on 22 February 2016).
30. Stanton, N.A.; Salmon, P.M.; Walker, G.H.; Salas, E.; Hancock, P.A. State-of-science: Situation awareness in individuals, teams and
systems. Ergonomics 2017, 60, 449–466. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
31. Banks, V.A.; Plant, K.L.; Stanton, N.A. Driver error or designer error: Using the Perceptual Cycle Model to explore the
circumstances surrounding the fatal Tesla crash on 7th May 2016. Saf. Sci. 2018, 108, 278–285. [CrossRef]
32. Stanton, N.A.; Salmon, P.M.; Walker, G.H.; Stanton, M. Models and Methods for Collision Analysis: A Comparison Study based
on the Uber collision with a pedestrian. Saf. Sci. 2019, 120, 117–128. [CrossRef]
33. Stanton, N.A. Developing and validating theory in ergonomics science. Theor. Issues Ergon. Sci. 2002, 3, 111–114.
34. Stanton, N.A.; Young, M.S.; Harvey, C. A Guide to Methodology in Ergonomics: Designing for Human Use, 2nd ed.; Taylor & Francis:
London, UK, 2014.
35. Baber, C.; Stanton, N.A. Human error identification techniques applied to public technology: Predictions compared with observed
use. Appl. Ergon. 1996, 27, 119–131. [CrossRef]
36. Stanton, N.A.; Stevenage, S. Learning to predict human error: Issues of reliability, validity and acceptability. Ergonomics 1998, 41,
1737–1756. [CrossRef]
37. Stanton, N.A.; Salmon, P.; Harris, D.; Marshall, A.; Demagalski, J.; Young, M.S.; Waldmann, T.; Dekker, S.W.A. Predicting pilot
error: Testing a new methodology and a multi-methods and analysts approach. Appl. Ergon. 2009, 40, 464–471. [CrossRef]
38. Harvey, C.; Stanton, N.A. Modelling the hare and the tortoise: Predicting the range of in-vehicle task times using critical path
analysis. Ergonomics 2013, 56, 16–33. [CrossRef]
39. Stanton, N.A.; Young, M.S. Giving ergonomics away? The application of ergonomics methods by novices. Appl. Ergon. 2003, 34,
479–490. [CrossRef]
40. Sarter, N.B.; Woods, D.D. How in the world did we ever get into that mode? Mode error and awareness in supervisory control.
Hum. Factors 1995, 37, 5–19. [CrossRef]
41. Stanton, N.A.; Dunoyer, A.; Leatherland, A. Detection of new in-path targets by drivers using Stop & Go Adaptive Cruise Control.
Appl. Ergon. 2011, 42, 592–601.
42. Landis, J.R.; Kock, G.G. The Measurement of Observer Agreement for Categorical Date. Biometrics 1977, 33, 159–174. [CrossRef]
[PubMed]
43. Matthews, B.W. Comparison of the predicted and observed secondary structure of T4 phage lysozyme. Biochim. et Biophys. Acta
(BBA)-Protein Struct. 1975, 405, 442–451. [CrossRef]
Future Transp. 2021, 1 369
44. Harris, D.; Stanton, N.A.; Marshall, A.; Young, M.S.; Demagalski, J.; Salmon, P. Using SHERPA to predict design-induced error on
the flight deck. Aerosp. Sci. Technol. 2005, 9, 525–532. [CrossRef]
45. Banks, V.A.; Stanton, N.A.; Burnett, G.; Hermawati, S. Distributed Cognition on the road: Using EAST to explore future road
transportation systems. Appl. Ergon. 2018, 68, 258–266. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
46. Clark, J.R.; Stanton, N.A.; Revell, M.A. Identified handover tools and techniques in high-risk domains: Using distributed situation
awareness theory to inform current practices. Saf. Sci. 2019, 118, 915–924. [CrossRef]
47. Salmon, P.M.; Walker, G.H.; Stanton, N.A. Pilot error versus sociotechnical systems failure: A distributed situation awareness
analysis of Air France 447. Theor. Issues Ergon. Sci. 2016, 17, 64–79. [CrossRef]
48. Endsley, M.R. Situation Awareness: Misconceptions and Misunderstandings. J. Cogn. Eng. Decis. Mak. 2015, 9, 4–32. [CrossRef]
49. Stanton, N.A.; Salmon, P.M.; Walker, G.H. Let the reader decide: A paradigm shift for situation awareness in sociotechnical
systems. J. Cogn. Eng. Decis. Mak. 2015, 9, 44–50. [CrossRef]
50. Clark, J.; Stanton, N.A.; Revell, K.M.A. Conditionally and highly automated vehicle handover: A study exploring vocal
communication between two drivers. Transp. Res. Part F Psychol. Behav. 2019, 65, 699–715. [CrossRef]
51. Abedi, A.; Gaudard, L.; Romerio, F. Review of major approaches to analyze vulnerability in power system. Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf.
2019, 183, 153–172. [CrossRef]
52. Leveson, N. A new accident model for engineering safer systems. Saf. Sci. 2004, 42, 237–270. [CrossRef]
53. Eriksson, A.; Stanton, N.A. Take-over time in highly automated vehicles: Transitions to and from manual control. Hum. Factors
2017, 59, 689–705. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
54. Stanton, N.A.; Baber, C. Error by design: Methods for predicting device usability. Des. Stud. 2002, 23, 363–384. [CrossRef]
55. Stanton, N.A.; Baber, C. Validating Task Analysis For Error Identification: Reliability and validity of a human error prediction
technique. Ergonomics 2005, 48, 1097–1113. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
56. Stanton, N.A.; Salmon, P.M.; Walker, G.H. New paradigms in Ergonomics. Ergonomics 2017, 60, 151–156. [CrossRef]
